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“(…) do not give him a fish;  
take him to the water and 













In many countries the shadow employment has a very high priority among policymakers. A new time series 
for this component of the labour market has been recently released by the Italian institute of statistics. Taken 
together they give the motivation and the occasion for a fresh analysis of the Italian labour market over the 
last two decades. The aim and the contribution of this paper is to highlight some stylised facts about the links 
between the two sides of the labour market, the dark and the regular. Results from “exhaustive” VAR/VEC 
models suggest that there are no connections (causal relationships, feedbacks, contemporaneous correlation) 
between  these  two  time  series.  In  this  sense,  we  could  correctly  refer  to  the  undeclared  work  as  an 
“independent” side of the Italian labour market. I interpret these results as providing empirical support for 
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The non-observed sector of the economy has neither a commonly accepted definition, nor even a commonly 
used name. A plethora of terms (underground, undeclared, moonlight, hidden, irregular, shadow, black, etc.) 
have been used to call it. All of them are suggestive of a particular aspect of the phenomenon, which is 
manifold. I will indifferently use here some of these adjectives but as the findings of this paper suggest, in 
the  Italian  case  another  suitable  label  could  be  “independent”.  Since  I  use  data  drawn  from  the  Italian 
national institute of statistics (Istat), the definition of black economy is the “official” one. Thus, the hidden 
sector which I refer to represents (U.N.  HW DO, 1993) the area of (legal) production activities that are not 
directly  observed  due  to  reasons  of  economic  nature  (deliberate  desire  to  avoid  taxes  and/or  to  avoid 
observing the law provisions concerning the labour market) and/or statistical nature (HJ due to the failure to 
fill out the administrative forms or statistics questionnaires).      
There are several important reasons to analyse the potential links between regular and irregular activity. In a 
highly indebted system may be useful to ask oneself if fiscal policy can go on with a long sequence of 
surpluses, hoping that the regular sector does not sensitively react. A “mass escape” from the regular sector 
would dramatically reduce government revenues worsening the public budget situation. On the positive side, 
in a climate of economic stagnation and decline the underground economy may serve a useful economic and 
social function providing jobs to many of willing workers. Economic literature suggests that tax rates are 
negatively associated both with the labour supply and/or with the tax evasion (Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
The linkages can derive from labour market policies as well. In a paper by Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) it is 
argued that any unemployment reducing policy will endogenously reduce shadow employment, while it is 
very  difficult  to  reduce  shadow  employment  without  increasing  unemployment.  By  and  large,  effective 
policies aimed (not necessarily in a direct way) to convert hidden labour into regular one should increase the 
time series correlation between them. In this sense, the underground economy could be seen as a resource 
rather than a constraint from the policymakers’ point of view. The tax amnesties implemented in Italy during 
the last decades are suggestive episodes as regard to this possibility.  
Against this background, this paper tries to highlight some stylised facts about the links between the two 
sides of the Italian labour market, the dark and the regular. Due to limited data availability, very few works 
address these issues with a medium-term perspective (some exemptions are Bovi, 1999; Busato and Chiarini, 
2004). The occasion to improve and to update the little available evidence is given by the recent Istat realise 
reporting annual data for the non-observed labour input (full-time equivalent
1, FTE, units) throughout the 
period  1980-2002  (Istat,  2004).  Working  with  these  new  data,  I  examine  the  relationships  between 
undeclared and regular FTE units via a time series analysis. Missing a consolidated economic theory and due 
to small sample issues, I chose to be as agnostic as possible. In other words, I do not carry out preliminary 
univariate analyses of the two (short) annual time series. Instead, I perform unit-root tests on the total FTE, 
available at quarterly frequency, to lessen the set of bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) models which 
should  include  the  correct  specification.  Then,  I  perform  innovation  accounting  and  impulse  response 
functions analyses in order to see if, how and how much the two faces of the market interact. Somewhat 
puzzling  (Busato  and  Chiarini,  2004;  Lucifora,  2003;  Signorelli,  1997),  all  models  point  to  the  same 
conclusion – the two sectors are orthogonal or, as suggested in the title, independent. No Granger causality, 
no contemporaneous correlation, and no shocks transfer from one market to another emerge from the data. 
This evidence is congruent with an interesting normative interpretation. During the last twenty years, policies 
had not a significant influence in transforming hidden employment into regular one.     
  
The paper is organised as follow. The next section deals with the Istat method and the data issues, section 3 
presents preliminary univariate tests, and section 4 is concerned with VARs analyses. Concluding remarks 
are collected in the final section.   

                                                           
1 The number of the full time equivalent units are equal to the number of jobs corresponding to full time. The total of 
full  time  equivalent  units  is  obtained  by  the  sum  of  (primary  and  secondary)  full-time  jobs  and  part-time  jobs 




The source of the data is Istat, thus the definition of the non-observed sector is the “official” one. The hidden 
production represents, according to the System of National Accounts (SNA) definition (U.N. HWDO, 1993), 
the area of (legal) production activities that are not directly observed due to reasons of economic nature 
(deliberate desire to avoid taxes and/or to avoid observing the law provisions concerning the labour market) 
and/or statistical nature (HJ due to the failure to fill out the administrative forms or statistics questionnaires). 
Istat claims that non-observed does not means non-measured (Calzaroni, 2000; Baldassarini and Pascarella, 
2003), and its estimation approach is known as the labour input method (OECD, 2002). Briefly, it consists in 
i) the use of sources and survey techniques that make possible to measure the weight of unregistered work 
(this  is  achieved  primarily  by  using  labour  status  particulars  declared  by  respondents  in  the  household 
surveys: it is assumed that individuals have less reasons than enterprises to conceal the nature of their work); 
ii) the correction of the under-reporting of income by the enterprises through adjustments of the per capita 
production and value added values declared by the small production units (fewer than 20 employees) and iii) 
the checks for the consistency of the economic aggregates through the balancing of the resources and uses 
made at the level of each industry. As a result, Istat publishes annual estimates of the irregular input of 
labour and GDP. The main focus of this paper is the labour market, therefore I deal with labour input (full 
time equivalent units) data. On the other hand, this time series is the only one available for the whole (1980-
2002) sample. 
 
While it is simple to describe, the practical application of the labour input method is more difficult (OECD, 
2004): 
 
- Labour force surveys provide estimates of the numbers of workers, while data from enterprise surveys 
usually refer to the number of jobs. The two sets of data must therefore be standardised by converting them 
to comparable units such as hours worked or full-time equivalents.  
- The comparison between the two independent sets of data needs to be made at as detailed a level as 
possible. Ideally this should be by size-classes as well as by detailed kinds of activities.  
-  The  method  depends  crucially  on  the  availability  of  comprehensive  estimates  of  labour  inputs.  Istat 
considers that the results of the household labour force survey, supplemented by demographic data, provide 
such  estimates
2.  The  Italian  survey  collects  information  on  the  kind  of  activity,  hours  worked,  and  the 
approximate number of employees in the enterprises where the respondents work. The survey also collects 
information on secondary jobs, which are relatively common in Italy for persons whose main job is with the 
government. In addition, Istat tries to take into account non-resident undocumented foreigner workers, which 
can not be observed directly by the usual sources used to uncover other kinds of black economy. 
 
Needless to say, although the method is internationally recognised to be a very good one (OECD, 2002) it is 
not immune from concerns and  problems. Even  if  it is reasonable to  assume  that individuals have  less 
reasons than enterprises to conceal the nature of their work, Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) point out that if 
employees cooperate in shadow activities they may decide not to declare to be working. As reported in their 
paper, a joint Istat-Fondazione Curella survey reports that about 25% of the black economy is wrongly 
assigned to the inactive status by the labour force survey. Also, some individuals who indicate to their 
interviewer that they are self-employed may actually be labouring in the underground economy. A study of 
the  US  internal  revenue  service
3 found  that  47%  of  the  workers  who  were  classified  as  independent 
contractors  did  not  report  any  taxable  income.  Then,  one  can  speculate  that  unemployment  could  be 
overstated in the surveys because respondents who should have been classified "out of the labour force" are 
fearful that they would lose benefits unless they indicated they were looking for work. On the other hand, 
some writers on the underground economy have pointed out that the low labour force participation might 
                                                           
2 Even  if  Istat  knows  (and  surveys)  only  regular  firms,  from  households’  answers  it  can  detect  irregular  workers 
engaged both for regular and for irregular firms.  
3 Budget of the United States Government, 1984, p. 5–120.   4 
reflect concealment of some employment activities (HJ Gutmann, 1979). Furthermore, as Tanzi suggests 
(Tanzi, 1981), the first issue for the irregular sector worker when approached by the interviewer, is whether 
to become a respondent. It seems reasonable to assume that he is more likely to be a non-respondent than he 
would be if he were not in the irregular sector. In the Istat approach, non-respondent are included in the 
“statistical  underground”,  which  is  allocated  to  the  observed  economy.  In  1998  the  percentage  of  non 
response was 3% of total GDP (Istat, 1998). On the other hand, the respondent may want to avoid telling 
anyone the truth about sources of income, and so will have concocted a convenient story intended to arouse 
the least suspicion. A non-specific but legitimate sounding job would appear the easiest way out for those 
individuals. In this case, the family survey data are larger than the firms’ones. 
 
Evidence reported in Di Nardo HWDO, (2000) may give an idea of the potential bias. In this paper is described 
a  survey  carried  out  in  San  Giuseppe  Vesuviano,  a  town  near  Naples  known  for  its  widespread  black 
employment. The standard method was that of the census survey, but conducted three times for the same 
universe in a period of a few months. Once by an interviewer not known to the local area; once by an 
interviewer who was known, using the indirect method of contacting ‘key observers’; and once by a known 
interviewer using the direct, door-to-door survey method, but establishing trust with the respondents and 
exploiting (fortuitously) her particular personal situation - she had to finish her thesis and she was pregnant. 
Where the standard method produced a result of 31.1% and that of the “informed persons” one of 35.8%, the 
third approach got 43.7%. While this kind of research may suggest that the bias could be significant, its 
scientific content and replicability is questionable. Just to mention, what about other “particular” personal 
situations? Then, it is really hard to imagine how this method could be structurally implemented in the 
system of national accounts.  
 
Having  said  that,  let  us  turn  the  attention  to  the  data.  The  two  time  series,  non-observed  labour  input 
(FTE_black) and regular labour input (FTE_reg), are displayed in Appendix 1. Figure 1 shows that the 
shadow employment has been raising more quickly in the first decade (for a total increase of about 24%), 
than thereafter (for a total increase of about 12%, excluding the 2002). Even recently, the problem of a 
booming underground sector is often evoked in political circles. On the contrary, data seem to suggest that 
the real question now is the level of the phenomenon, not its growth. To the extent the shadow workers have 
a lower productivity than the regular ones, these dynamics are consistent with the reversion of the jobless 
economic growth started in the mid-1990s (Bertola and Garibaldi, 2003). Up to the 1998, the behaviour of 
the irregularity ratio (black employment on total FTE) is more uniform (Figure 2). As refer to FTE_reg, it 
can be noticed the effect of the 1993 crisis and the strong recovery starting in 1998. The irregularity ratio 
clearly show the impact of the legalisation-regularisation of about 700,000 illegal immigrants in 2002 (Istat, 
2004).   
 
   5 
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One  common  way  to  properly  analyse  the  empirical  relationships  between  time  series  is  the  vector 
autoregression approach. The first necessary step before validly estimating and using a VAR model is the 
analysis  of  the  stochastic  properties  of  the  involved  series.  The  attention  devoted  to  this  topic  is  well 
deserved for several reasons. On the one hand in contrast to stationary or trend stationary time series, models 
with a stochastic trend are persistent in the sense that shocks have permanent effects on the values of the 
process; otherwise stated, they have time dependent variances that go to infinity with time. Second, when a 
series is used in regressions with other variables the interpretation of the regression results can depend on 
whether the variables involved are trend (TS) or difference (DS) stationary. This phenomenon is related to 
the “nonsense” and “spurious” regression literature (Phillips, 1986) due to Yule (1926) and Granger and 
Newbold (1974).  
It is also well known that unit root tests are based on asymptotic critical values. One expects in finite samples 
that  the  use  of  asymptotic  critical  values  will  result  in  over-rejection,  and  twenty-three  (1980-2002) 
observations are definitively a finite sample. I address this potential problem with a two-steps procedure. 
First, I test if the total labour input time series (FTE_tot=FTE_black+FTE_reg) is an integrated process. I can 
be sufficiently sure about the robustness of this result because FTE_tot is disposable at quarterly frequency, 
thus I have about ninety observations. In this first step I pin down the stochastic properties of the total labour 
input. Then, I take advantage of the algebra of integrated processes (Granger and Hallmann,  1991) to shrink 
the “exhaustive” VAR analysis only to the remaining (plausible) models. This latter analysis is the second 
step of the procedure (section 4). 
 
I perform two unit root tests. The first (NP) was worked out by Ng and Perron (2001) and it is four-fold. It 
yields both substantial power gains and a lower size distortions over the standard unit root tests, maintaining 
the null of unit root. NP offer four test statistics based on the Generalized Least Squared (GLS) detrended 
data  \
￿
￿ . Altogether these statistics are enhanced versions of Phillips-Perron Za and Zt statistics (1988), the 
Bargava R1 statistic (1986), and the Elliot HWDO Point Optimal statistic (1996): 
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￿ 1 - )2)/T2  and f0 is an estimate of the residual spectral density at the zero frequency
4. The 
choice of the autoregressive truncation lag, p, is critical for correct calculation of f0. Here p is chosen using 
the modified AIC suggested by Ng and Perron (2001).  
 
The second is the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski, HWDO (1992)), which can be thought as complementing the NP 
one because it tests the null hypothesis that FTE_tot is a TS stochastic process. Suppose the NP test fails to 
reject the unit root null because of low power. The KPSS test which has (trend) stationarity as the null should 
indicate the data have no unit roots. On the other hand, if the KPSS test rejects the trend stationarity null, 
                                                           
4 The frequency zero spectrum method used is the AR-GLS detrended.   6 
then we have stronger evidence for unit root persistence. That is, consistent results from NP and KPSS tests 
yield more persuasive evidence on data persistence, while conflicting results indicate
5 uncertainty associated 
with the interpretation of the individual test outcomes. The KPSS test is based upon the residuals from the 
OLS regression of yt on the exogenous variables xt: 
 
yt = xt’d + ut 
 
 
The LM statistic is be defined as: 
LM = å
￿





where f0 is an estimator
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Table 1. Unit root tests on (log-)labour input (FTE units, quarterly data 1980:1-2002:4) 
    MZa  MZt  MSB  MPT  KPSS* 


































































































































































































































































Lag length criterion Modified AIC; D(x)=x-x-1; *H0: TS process; **constant and trend included; only constant.    
 
 
Table 1 indicates that the (log) level of the labour input time series is a DS process. NP M-tests fail to reject 
the null of a unit root, while KPSS strongly rejects the null of stationariety
7. On the other hand, the first 
difference of FTE_tot is stationary.  
 
This outcome implies that FTE_black and FTE_reg can be neither both stationary nor cointegrated with a 
cointegration  coefficient  equal  to  one.  In  fact,  Granger  and  Hallmann  (1991)  show  that  for  a  pair  of 
independent variables holds (omitting coefficients and using a widespread notation): 
 
 
I(0) + I(0) = I(0); I(1) + I(0) = I(1); I(1) + I(1) = I(1). 
 
 
If the two series are cointegrated, then I(d)+ I(d) = I(d-1), where d is the order of integration. 
 
So, we remain with four possible VAR models linking the two components of FTE_tot
8 (in log, D(x)=x-x-1): 
                                                           
5 Conflicting results might also indicate the presence of fractionally integrated processes. 
6 The frequency zero spectrum method used is the Kernel-Bartlett sum-of-covariances. 
7 Standard ADF and nonparametric Phillips-Perron tests confirm the I(1) nature of FTE_tot.   
8 A unit root in FTE_tot could be validly consistent with the cointegrated and I(2) nature of its two parts. I can not rule 
out this event because the labour input is a stock variable, thus its first difference may be an I(1) flow. As somewhat 
expected, tentative unit root tests show mixed evidence on the I(0) vs I(1) nature of FTE_black and FTE_reg.   7 
  
Model 1:  FTE_black; D(FTE_reg); 
Model 2:  D(FTE_black); FTE_reg; 
Model 3:  D(FTE_black); D(FTE_reg); 
Model 4:  FTE_black; FTE_reg (VECM). 
 
 
The first two bivariate VARs are consistent with the case “only one FTE component is I(1)”, Model 3 would 
be valid if both FTE_black and FTE_reg were DS but non cointegrated, the last model account for the 
possibility of a cointegrating relationship between them. Altogether, these models make up an “exhaustive” 
VAR analysis including the “true” model. To uncover robust results while operating under this “veil of 
ignorance and caution”, it needs to obtain “all-models” information. Otherwise stated, since I do not know 
which model is correctly parameterised in order to draw any conclusion evidence pointing in one direction 
independently of the model is necessary. On the positive side, uniform findings turn out to be very robust.  
 
 




Through the analysis of the covariances, the VAR approach allows us to see if one market has a tendency to 
lead the other, if there are feedbacks between them, and how do impulses (shocks, innovations) transfer from 
one  sector  to  another.  The  VAR  approach  (Sims,  1980)  sidesteps  the  need  for  structural  modelling  by 
treating every endogenous variables in the system as a function of the lagged values of all the endogenous 












A may be contemporaneously correlated, but are uncorrelated with their own lagged values 
and  uncorrelated  with  all of  the  right-hand  side  variables.  Since  only  lagged  values  of  the  endogenous 
variables  appear  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  equations,  simultaneity  is  not  an  issue  and  OLS  yields 
consistent estimates. Moreover, even though the innovations may be contemporaneously correlated, OLS is 
efficient and equivalent to GLS since all equations have identical regressors. A basic assumption in the 
above model is that the residual vector follows a multivariate white noise. Also, in order that the VAR-model 
is stationary, it is required that roots of _,F]F]
B
«FS]
C _  lie outside the unit circle. Provided 


















I y  is an m×m coefficient matrix. The e
A 
V represent shocks in the system. Suppose we have a unit 
change in e
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Accordingly  the  interpretation  of  the y matrices  is  that  they  represent  marginal  effects,  or  dynamic 
multipliers, or the model's response to a unit shock (or innovation) at time point t in each of the variables. 
The response of \
H to a unit shock in \
























T  is the ijth element of the matrix  
U y  (i, j = 1, . . . , m). Generally speaking an IRF traces the effect 
of a one-time shock to one of the innovations on current and future values of the endogenous variables. 
Otherwise stated, the IRFs trace out how the variables will deviate from the path predicted by the model if 
there is a forecast error with respect to a specific equation at time t. Unforeseen movements in \
M  are referred 




 is a diagonal matrix, the shocks will not occur independent from each other. The conventional 
practice in the VAR literature is to single out the individual effects by first orthogonalise the error covariance 
matrix,  HJ  by  Cholesky  decomposition,  such  that  the  new  residuals  become  contemporaneously 
uncorrelated with unit variances. Unfortunately orthogonalization is not unique in the sense that changing the 
order of variables in \ changes the results. The economic theory may be used to solve the ordering issue. As 
usual  the  approach  I  follow  here  is  agnostic,  and  it  is  based  on  examining  the  two  possible  orderings 
(because of the bivariate VAR) to see whether the resulting interpretations are consistent. Since in a bivariate   9 
model  the  Granger-causality  implies  that  one  variable  must  react  to  a  shock  of  the  other,  within  this 
framework I can address the causality issues
9 as well. 
 
The uncorrelatedness of the new residuals allows the error variance of the s step-ahead forecast of \
H
A to be 
decomposed into components accounted for by these shocks. Because the innovations have unit variances, 
the components of this error variance accounted for by innovations to \


















Z is the orthogonalised version of  
Z . Comparing this to the sum of innovation responses we get a 
relative measure how important variable  \
M  innovations are in the explaining the variation in variable i at 












































Thus, while IRFs trace the effects of a shock to one endogenous variable on to the other variables in the 
VAR, variance decomposition separates the variation in an endogenous variable into the component shocks 
to  the  VAR.  Clearly,  even  the  variance  decomposition  results  depend  on  the  ordering  when  there  is 
contemporaneous correlation between the residuals. Again, for the robustness of the findings I replicate the 
two possible orderings of the bivariate VAR.  
 
Another  useful  and workable set  of  experiments  within  the  present statistical-atheoretical  context is  the 
analysis of the generalised IRFs. Pesaran and Shin (1998) have suggested a theoretically neutral way of 
deriving impulse responses that takes into account the information on the correlation of errors contained in 
the error covariance matrix. These authors construct an orthogonal set of innovations that does not depend on 
the VAR ordering. The generalized impulse responses from an innovation to the jth variable are derived by 
applying  a  variable  specific  Cholesky  factor  computed  with  the  jth  variable  at  the  top  of  the  Cholesky 
ordering. It should be noticed that the generalised response profiles derived in this way are not conveying 
information about economic causation among the variables. The exercise can be thought of as tracing out 
how the observation of a forecast error in one equation of the system would lead to revisions in the forecast 
path of all model variables.  
 
Finally, in the absence of contemporaneous exogenous variables the disturbance variance–covariance matrix 
contains all the information about contemporaneous correlations among the variables. Thus, the more the 
results are independent from the ordering, the more the innovations are contemporaneously uncorrelated. The 
IRFs and the (low) residuals contemporaneous correlation reported in Appendix 3 give a visual idea of the 
effect of the latter on the former. In that, we have another useful indication from this analysis. 
 
Estimating the parameters in a VAR requires that the involved variables be covariance stationary, meaning 
that their first two moments exist and are time invariant. If they are not covariance stationary, but their first-
differences are (see section 3), a vector error-correction model (VECM) can be used to perform the same set 
of experiments. In fact, a VECM is nothing else than a restricted VAR designed for use with nonstationary 
                                                           
9 As well known, the Granger causality does not imply that a variable x is the effect or the result of a variable y. It just 
measures precedence and information content.   10 
series that are known to be cointegrated. Basically, unlike unrestricted VARs, the VECM has cointegration 
relations (equations) built into the specification so that it restricts the long-run behaviour of the endogenous 
variables to converge to their cointegrating relationships while allowing for short-run adjustment dynamics. 
The cointegration term is known as the error correction term since the deviation from long-run equilibrium is 
corrected gradually through a series of partial short-run adjustments. Otherwise equal VECMs may differ in 
their deterministic part. Actually, the series may have nonzero means and deterministic trends as well as 
stochastic trends. Similarly, the cointegrating equations may have intercepts and deterministic trends. Since 
FTE_black and FTE_reg seem to be trending series (see Appendix 1) and for robustness, I perform two 
plausible kinds of VECMs (Models 4 and 5 in Appendix 2). In the first VECM, the cointegrating equation
10 
has only the intercept; in the second, the cointegrating equation has both the intercept and the linear trend. 
Unlike the unrestricted VAR case, the innovation response plots for VECMs are not endowed with standard 
error  bands  since  some  of  the  maximum  likelihood  parameter  estimates  have  nonstandard  asymptotic 
distributions. 
 
Despite just one model is correctly specified, the analyses of the VAR residuals reported in Appendix 2 
(tables 1a-5a) suggest that all the models provide a fair description of the information in the data. After 
controlling for one or two outliers each and every VAR satisfies residual assumptions, while there is no sign 
of instability
11. The limited sample available is likely to play a role, suggesting that it is worth performing 
several models. The following figures (Appendix 3) plot the relative mean estimates of the (Cholesky and 
Generalised) impulse response functions and show the variance decomposition outcomes. The pure shape of 
impulse  functions  is  not  fully  informative  of  whether  a  detected  reaction  path  is  also  meaningful  in  a 
statistical sense. Thus, I also display the upper and lower limits of a 95% Monte Carlo band
12. Clearly, if 
these bands contain the zero line one can conclude that there is evidence of no reaction. All the unrestricted 
VARs  have  the  same  exogenous  variable,  namely  a  constant.  Not  reported  sensitivity  analyses  conduct 
adding a linear or a quadratic trend do not substantially change the stylised facts that emerge. These latter are 
reported and commented in the following section. 
 
 
                                                           
10 Obviously, within a bivariate VAR framework at most one cointegrating relation is possible. 
11 All the inverse roots of the characteristic AR polynomial lie inside the unit circle (Appendix 2).  
12 As already mentioned, for VECMs it is not possible to calculate standard errors.   11 
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The aim of this paper is to study if, how, and how much the dark and the regular side of the Italian labour 
market are linked. In doing that I exploit the recently released time series data for these two components, 
which are analysed in a VAR framework. Because of small sample issues (the annual data cover the period 
1980-2002) it is hard to infer the correct location of unit roots, if any, in the system. That is why I “over-
model”, LH I estimate all plausible VAR specifications, which include the correct one. Then, I focus only on 
evidence pointing in one direction independently of the model. These robust results may be summarised in 
the following statements: 
 
·  the  Italian  labour  market  seems  to  be  made  up  by  two  independent  components,  one  regular,  one 
irregular. In particular,  
·  unequivocal evidence shows that there is neither contemporaneous correlation, nor Granger causality 
between them. Also, shocks hitting one labour input do not lead to any reaction in the other. 
 
It is worth recalling that statistical experiments have stronger ability in negating than in supporting the 
occurrence of an event. Thus, the outcomes are robust even in this respect. 
 
The picture emerging from the empirical analysis is coherent with an interpretation particularly interesting 
for its normative content. Good labour market policies, directly
13 or indirectly targeted to reduce shadow 
employment,  should  convert  black  workers  into  regular  ones  (Comitato  per  l’emersione  del  lavoro  non 
regolare, 2004). To be effective, they should therefore induce a negative correlation between these two kinds 
of input. Since data tell a different story, it turns out that despite several efforts throughout the last twenty 
years policies were not able to impinge on the two faces of the labour market in a significant way. This is 
somewhat consistent with the studies by Censis (2003), Bàculo (2002), Mateman and Renooy (2001), and 
with the widespread dissatisfaction expressed in the political circles over the situation that has been reached 
in the recent years
14.  
 
A possible explanation is the following. Basically, the mainstream literature (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972 
and followers) suggests that the hidden activity depends on its relative costs (the expected penalty) and 
revenues. The former depends on “institutional” factors (corruption, the efficiency/credibility of the public 
sector,  etc.),  the  latter  on  “economic”  determinants  (such  as  the  tax  wedge).  In  Italy,  shadow  reducing 
policies  have  usually  been  aimed  to  hamper  the  revenues  for  black  agents  –  often  via  tax 
amnesties/reductions. Less has been done to rise the cost to be underground. Sometimes these latter measures 
just consist in claiming “zero tolerance”, which is in sharp contrast with the reiterate use of amnesties
15. This 
raises  a  problem  of  credibility,  whose  importance  in  fighting  the  underground  sector  is  documented  in 
several papers. Johnson  HW DO (1997) Friedman,  HW DO (2000), Kaufman (2003), and Bovi (2004) report 
cross-country evidence showing the pivotal role of institutions as a determinant of the “quit option”. Bovi 
and Castellucci (2001) find similar findings for the Italian regions, while Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) argue 
that a total repression of the informal sector is not a credible threat because it is very difficult to reduce 
shadow  employment  without  increasing  unemployment.  It  is  not  (only)  a  carrot  and  stick  matter,  an 
investment in the overall institutional credibility/efficiency could be very productive even in this field. Also, 
peculiar factors may be at work behind the aggregate results and it is likely that generic policy efforts does 
not target all the causes of the undeclared employment
16. The underground activity is a very a complex 
                                                           
13 An  example  of  these  policies  are  the  wage  alignment  agreements  (contratti  di  riallineamento),  implemented 
throughout the 90s. For a survey of direct and indirect policies implemented in Italy to combat underground labour, see 
Lucifora (2003). 
14 Starting from 1998 Italian governments seem to have increased their efforts and to have changed approach in tackling 
the  problem  Mateman  and  Renooy  (2001).  For  instance,  a  “Committee  for  the  Exposure  of  Undeclared  Work” 
(Comitato per l’emersione del lavoro non regolare) was appointed in that year to discourage the black employment and 
to encourage the regular one.   
15 In passing, a survey by the World Bank shows that intermittent amnesties have had negative public revenue effects in 
all empirical studies that examine them (see: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/tax/amnesties.html#how). 
16 ,QWHU DOLD, if shadow activity is performed within a “network” (LH if firms buy and sell from other underground 
units), they can not emerge even if it is profitable from the individual point of view. In this case the policy target should 
be the whole network.         12 
phenomenon (Brunetta and Ceci, 1998; Ministero del Tesoro, 2001; Meldolesi, 2003), and if a “one-policy-
fits-all” approach may be ineffective, a step-by-step “fine tailoring” procedure may generate only a modest 
impact at the aggregate level, even in the medium term. This normative framework and empirical evidence 
shed some light on the suggested (Censis, 2003) hypothesis that firms respond more to tax credits for hiring 
new employees than to tax amnesties, in both cases without significantly abating the shadow employment. 
Then, it might be that the proposed policies did not still get profitable for firms to regularise black workers 
because their productivity is lower
17 (ISAE, 2002). To change their status they should structurally have a 
lower wage. As suggested (Boeri, 2002), wage policies could help in this dual market.  
 
Problems may also stem from the labour supply-side (Ministero del Lavoro, 1987). Undertaking programs 
and moving in general towards the reduction of revenues for black agents may be hampered by the presence 
of  means-tested  benefits  and  by  the  prohibition for civil  servants  and  retirees  to  cumulate  other  labour 
incomes. This latter condition just leaves no choice - black or nothing, in that preventing links between the 
two sides of the labour market. As for the former, the case of “social useful workers” and/or of beneficiaries 
of CIGS (extraordinary wages guarantee fund) working as irregulars, is instructive. They do not accept 
regularisation because they would loose the benefit. In addition, it is useful to spend some words about 
illegal immigrants. The only policy measure successfully transforming black jobs into regular ones seems to 
be the last legalisation
18 of illegal immigrants (Istat, 2004). A visual inspection of Figure 2 (Appendix 1) is 
suggestive of its impact despite the still marginal role of this item (about 16% on total FTE_black). A simple 
reason for that is that it is much more pressing to be legalised (LH to get the residency permit) than to be 
regularised (LH to work regularly). Moreover, it may be that the “institutional constraint” is more binding on 
illegal  immigrants  than  on  underground  natives.  A survey by Isae  (2002)  shows that  to  combat hidden 
employment in the personal services sector, featured by a widespread share of irregular foreigner workers, 
Italian households prefer a tax reduction to anti-crime intervention programs.  
 
To conclude, some FDYHDW. Results are data dependent, that is I can not exclude that the outcomes are biased 
because of measurement errors, such as those stemming from black workers with wrongly assigned labour 
status, or from non-exhaustive surveys. Then, I focus on full time equivalent units. While they measure the 
amount of labour input used in producing GDP, they do not allow to study the impact of policies on the 
number of jobs/persons. Finally, results are sample dependent and it could be just too early to judge the 
recently implemented policies. In longer samples these latter could induce the wanted negative correlation. 
Let us wait and see.    
 
                                                           
17 See Busato and Chiarini (2004) for a two-sector RBC theoretical model with lower-productive black workers.   
18 In 2002, about 274,000 FTE units were regularised. Other legalisations (1990, 1996, 1998) are not so visible in the 
data (see Figure 2).    13 
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Table 1a.  VAR Model 1: D(FTE_reg); FTE_black. One lag. Eigenvalues (modulus): 0.91; 0.51 
Multivariate tests 
Portmanteau Q-Stat  3 lags              
= 
7.91 [0.4423] a 
Normality J-B  
 = 
4.653 [0.3248] 
Hetero C2  No Cross Terms 
= 
17.034 [0.3151] 
Hetero C2  Cross Terms 
= 
21.25 [0.671] 
D(x)=first difference of variable x; variables in logs; p-values in squared brackets; a=adjusted version. Point dummy in 
1993 included. 
 
Table 2a.  VAR Model 2: FTE_reg; D(FTE_black). Two lags. Eigenvalues (modulus): 0.88; 0.45  
Multivariate tests 
Portmanteau  Q-Stat  3 lags              
= 
 8.763 [0.0673] a 
Normality J-B  
 = 
4.553 [0.3364] 
Hetero C2  No Cross Terms 
= 
28.93 [0.2228] 
Hetero C2  Cross Terms 
= 
46.96 [0.2766] 
See legend under table 1a.  
 
Table 3a. VAR Model 3: D(FTE_reg); D(FTE_black). One lag. Eigenvalues (modulus): 0.58; 0.24 
Multivariate tests 
Portmanteau  Q-Stat  3 lags              
= 
 3.564 [0.8941] a 
Normality J-B  
 = 
5.12 [0.2753] 
Hetero C2  No Cross Terms 
= 
17.71 [0.1246] 
Hetero C2  Cross Terms 
= 
 23.75 [0.07] 
See legend under table 1a. Point dummy in 2002 included. 
 
Table 4a. VECM Model 4: VAR and cointegrating equation with intercepts (no trend): One lag.  
Multivariate tests 
Portmanteau  Q-Stat  3 lags              
= 
9.81 [0.2787] a 
Normality J-B  
 = 
3.921 [0.4168] 
Hetero C2  No Cross Terms 
= 
17.39 [0.687] 
Hetero C2  Cross Terms 
= 
26.15 [0.6676] 
See legend under table 1a.  Point dummies in 1993 and 2002 included. 
 
Table 5a. VECM Model 5: VAR with intercept (no trend), cointegrating equation with intercept and trend. One lag.   
Multivariate tests 
Portmanteau  Q-Stat  3 lags              
= 
 [0.524] a 
Normality J-B  
 = 
 [0.3248] 
Hetero C2  No Cross Terms 
= 
 [0.3151] 
Hetero C2  Cross Terms 
= 
 [0.671] 
See legend under table 1a. Point dummies in 1993 and 2002 included. 
   18 
Appendix 3. Impulse Response and Innovation Accounting Analysis 
In  all  the  figures,  the  Cholesky  ordering  for  the  relative  impulse  functions  and  for  the  variance 
decomposition analysis is FTE_reg; FTE_black => FTE_black; FTE_reg. In all figures, but the VECMs (for 
which S.E. can not be computed), the ± 2 S.E bands are drawn from 1000 Monte Carlo replications.  
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VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
/+6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)7(B5(*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C2  Prob.  C2  Prob. 
Excluded  DLOG(FTE_BLACK) 
0.8235  0.3642 
Excluded  DLOG(FTE_REG) 
2.041  0.1531 
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VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
/+6'/2*)7(B5(* /+6'/2*)7(B%/$&.
C2  Prob.  C2  Prob. 
Excluded  DLOG(FTE_BLACK) 
0.9432  0.3315 
Excluded  DLOG(FTE_REG) 
1.114  0.2912 
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